Energy and utility operators (electricity, water, gas) combine two characteristics that make them a priority target: dependence on industrial control systems (SCADA, PLCs, sensors) frequently designed before cybersecurity was a design criterion, and critical-infrastructure status that exposes them to both opportunistic cybercriminal groups and strategically motivated state actors. Even a partial disruption has a direct impact on the continuity of an essential service — which changes the nature of the risk: it is no longer only about protecting data, but about guaranteeing the physical availability of a service.
Last updated — August 22, 2026
Dragos, annual ICS/OT Cybersecurity reports
IBM, Cost of a Data Breach Report
No — the methodology applied to OT environments systematically favors non-intrusive techniques (passive analysis, configuration review, interviews) to avoid any risk of service interruption.
Yes, provided OT log sources are accessible without compromising the safety of control equipment; the monitoring scope is defined jointly with operations teams.
An industrial systems audit applies specific frameworks (notably IEC 62443) and accounts for the availability constraints unique to control environments, unlike a standard IT audit.
In most jurisdictions, energy and utility operators hold critical-infrastructure status, with audit and incident-reporting obligations tied to that status.